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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
UAW,

Local 1017

OPINION AND AWARD
Case # 1230 0293 77

and
Accurate Brass Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Was there proper cause for the discharge
of James R. Hunter, and if not what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held in New Britain, Connecticut on February
27, 1978 at which time Mr. Hunter, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievant was discharged for excessive absenteeism.
Among the well settled arbitral principles is the consistent holding that a record of excessive absenteeism which is
unresponsive to and continues despite "progressive discipline"
penalties of warnings and a suspension, is grounds for discharge
regardless of the reasons for the absenteeism and even if that
record is beyond the employee's fault or control.
For reasons of efficient production and services, an
employer need not retain an employee who cannot be on the job

-2-

regularly.

Therefore, mitigation of the penalty of discharge,

where, for example, the poor attendance record is due to illnesses, is a matter for the employer and not for the arbitrator.
The instant case fits within the foregoing rule.

There

is no real dispute that the grievant's attendance record had
been unsatisfactory

through the year 1976 and until his discharge

on August 1, 1977.

At reasonable intervals and progressively,

he had been warned verbally, warned in writing and suspended for
four days.

Yet his unsatisfactory

attendance record continued,

and there was no reasonable indication that the various conditions which caused that record had abated.

Also, the "progressive

discipline" penalties of warnings and suspension were not
grieved, and may not now be impeached.

That the grievant's last

period of absence which triggered his discharge was due to illness and hospitalization, is unfortunate.
indicated, that circumstance

But as previously

is not an exception to but rather

is encompassed within the applicable rule in such situations.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of James R. Hunter was
for proper cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

-3-

DATE: March 20, 1978
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this twentieth day of March, 1978, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

-X

In the Matter of the Arbitration
Between
THE ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE HOSPITALS, INC.

AW&RD OF
ARBITRATOR

-and-

LOCAL 144, HOTEL, HOSPITAL, NURSING HOME
AND ALLIED HEALTH SERVICES UNION, S.E.I.U.,
AFL-CIO
-X

The undersigned Arbitrator, having heard the proofs and
arguments of the parties, awards as follows:
1.

*

Effective December 15, 1977, the affected employees

employed as of that date shall receive a five (5%} per cent
across-the-board wage increase.
2.

Effective December 15, 1977, all minimum rates in-

cluded in the collective bargaining agreement and memoranda of
agreement between the parties shall be increased by five (5%)
per cent, the minimum rates affected being those established as
of August 1, 1975.
3.

Member hospitals shall not be required to make any

current contributions (8^%) to the Local 144 Hospital Welfare Fund
for the months of February, March and April, 1978.
Dated:

New York, N. Y.,
March 1, 1978.

ERIC J. SCHMERTT:, Arbitrator
STATE OF NEW YORK ) ss. :
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)
On the 1st day of March, 1978, before me personally came
ERIC J. SCHMERTZ, to me known and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and he duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Notary Public
, ...55.11 COM;
S 30, !

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Port Jefferson Station Teachers
Association
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1739 0197 77

The Board of Education of Union
Free School District No. 3

In accordance with Article XXVIII of the Agreement dated
July 1, 1976 between The Board of Education of Union Free School
District No. 3

hereinafter referred to as the "District", and the

Port Jefferson Station Teachers Association hereinafter referred
to as the "Association", the Undersigned was designated as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the District violate the Agreement when
it did not schedule one-half days for the
elementary schools during the last week of
school in the 1976-1977 school year? If so
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the District's offices in Port
Jefferson Station on May 3, 1978.

Representatives of the Associa-

tion and District appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Both sides filed

post-hearing statements.
This dispute involves the enforceability of Article XXIV
Paragraph B (7) of the Agreement which reads:
Elementary schools shall be open for halfdays during the last week of school.

-2The basic facts are not in dispute.

Prior to the 1976-1977

school year the District complied with the foregoing contract
provision by scheduling students for half-day attendance at the
elementary schools during the last week of the school year.

The

teachers worked a full day in each of the days of the last week,
but the students left after completing a half-day.

The remaining

hours in each of the days were used by the teachers to finish
paper work and to complete other assignments which could not be
done if they were required to teach and/or to supervise students.
The teachers were paid for the full day.
However, during the last week of the school year 1976-1977
the District scheduled and the students attended full days.
The Association contents that as a consequence of the
District's failure to schedule half-days for the students during
the last week of the school year 1976-1977, the teachers were unable to complete paper work and other administrative assignments
during the regular school day, and had to work overtime or beyond
regular school hours in order to finish that work.

The Associa-

tion claims a breach of the Agreement and seeks monetary payment
to the teachers for the additional hours worked or compensatory
time off, of one half-day for each of the five days involved.
The District asserts that Article XXIV Paragraph B (7) has
been voided by Section 175.5 of the Regulations of the Commissioner
of Education and the corresponding Education Law dealing with
"length of school day for State Aid purposes" and by the application of Article XX of the contract.

Said Article reads:

-3If any provisions of this Agreement or any
application of the Agreement to any teacher
or group of teachers shall be found contrary
to law, then such provision or application
shall not be deemed valid and subsisting except to the extent permitted by law, but all
other provisions or applications shall continue
in full force and effect.
The District points out that this regulation and law were promulgated and passed subsequent to the contract negotiation of
Article XXIV Paragraph B (7) and are therefore preeminent.

The

District argues that the Regulation and Education Law require a
school calendar of no less than 180 days and, except for certain
specified exceptions, a school week that does not fall below 25
hours.

It points out that in light of its calendar for the 1976-

1977 school year (pursuant to Article XXIV Paragraph B (8) a
reduction to half days during the last week of the school would
bring the hours per week below the minimum prescribed by the
Commissioner's Regulations and the Education Law.

The District

contends that any requirement that it do so would be "contrary to"
the Education Law within the meaning of Article XXD and hence
Article XXIV B (7) cannot be enforced.
The Union responds that the Commissioner's Regulations and
the corresponding Education Law dealing with the length of the
school day for State Aid purposes is not a "law" within the
meaning of Article XXD of the Agreement.

It argues that the

District need only comply with that regulation if it wishes to
receive State Aid, but that there is no penalty for non-compliance

-4except the loss of State Aid.

Alternatively the Union asserts

that the District could have complied with the contractual
provision calling for one-half days during the last week of
school by hiring substitute teachers on a per diem basis to
supplement the regular elementary school teachers during the
period involved so that the latter could devote the last half of
each day to ministerial and administrative

duties.

The question narrows to whether the implementation of the
one-half day school day in the last week of the 1976-1977 school
year, in the face of the minimum calendar requirement of the
Education Law would constitute an "application of the Agreement..
....found contrary to law" within the meaning of Article XXD of
the Agreement.
I call attention to the fact that Article XXD invalidates
a contract provision which:
shall be found contrary to law. (emphasis added)
In my judgement that phraseology relates to a finding by a forum
with authoritative jurisdiction, that a provision or application
of the Agreement is contrary to law.

Though this Arbitrator may

have the legal ability to make a determination as to whether he
thinks the Education Law preempts or nullifies the contract
provision for shortened school days during the last school week,
he lacks the jurisdictional power to make any such determination
on an authoritative basis.

Interpretations of the Education Law

fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Education
Department and the courts of this State.

-5I believe that the foregoing quoted language was intended
by the parties to restrict legal interpretations of whether any
part of the collective bargaining agreement conflicts with external law or legal regulations outside of the contract, to the
forums which have legal and/or authoritative jurisdiction over
those laws and regulations, namely the appropriate administrative
agencies and/or the courts.

Consequently I deem it beyond the

scope of the Arbitrator's authority and beyond his "jurisdictional competence" to determine whether the implementation of
Article XXIV B (7) would be contrary to the Education Law and/or
the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education.

The rights

of the parties in any action on that question in any other forum,
are reserved.
That leaves this proceeding simply with the undisputed fact
that in the 1976-1977 school year the District did not follow the
provisions of Article XXIV B (7).

Accordingly, within the con-

fines of the contract and based on the Arbitrator's limited
authority as expressed above, the District violated the Agreement
However as happens from time to time in legal or quasilegal proceedings, the violation of a right may not necessarily
carry a remedy.

That is the case here.

The Association asserts,

but has offered no probative evidence to show that on the days
involved the teachers actually worked additional hours beyond
those they normally worked to perform and complete their various
duties.

-6-

Nor is there any provision for "overtime hours",
or for the payment thereof either monetarily or by compensatory
time off.

Additionally, it is undisputed that teachers, who worked

the full days in question, were paid for a full days work.

Neithe

is there any showing that during the hours they worked they were
required to perform duties outside of their regular job assignments.

Consequently I find nothing in the facts or in the

Agreement which would warrant the monetary remedy or compensatory
time off which the Association seeks.

Hence my decision, condi-

tioned by all of the foregoing, must be limited simply to a
finding that under the Agreement, and within the Arbitrator's
jurisdiction, the District violated the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following

AWARD:

The District violated Article XXIV B (7)
of the Agreement when it did not schedule
one-half days for the elementary schools
during the last week of school 1976-1977.
Neither the Agreement nor the facts provide
for any remedy.

DATED: May 30, 1978
STATE OF: New York )v oc
s,s • •
COUNTY OF
)

Eric J. Schmertz

On this thirtieth day of May, 1978, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Federation of Technical College
Teachers, Local 1942, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 39 0067 78

and
Board of Trustees, Connecticut State
Technical Colleges - Hartford State
Technical College

The stipulated issue is:
Did the employer violate Article VIII P
of the contract by failing to grant compensatory time to Dr. Nina Stein in connection with Organic Chemistry CH200 and
Organic Chemistry CH210? If so what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Hartford, Connecticut on May 22,
1978 at which time Dr. Stein, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named College and
Union, hereinafter referred to respectively as the "Employer"
and the "Union" appeared.

All concerned were afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Union and the Employer filed post-hearing briefs.
Article VIII P reads:
New Course Development:
A Faculty Member who is assigned by
the Dean of Instruction to develop
a new course shall have his load reduced by the number of contact hours
assigned to such course.

The

-2I am persuaded that the foregoing contract provision contains two implicit conditions which support and justify the load
reduction.

The first is that the "new course" be developed with-

in an academic year when classes are in session and when otherwise the Faculty Member so assigned would would be carrying a full
load.

And second, that the new course be new, not just to the

Employer, but also the Faculty Member, thereby requiring a
significant amount of his or her time to effectuate its development.

Only as a consideration of both conditions - specifically

to accord the Faculty Member the time necessary to develop the
new course, is a reduction in a normal, full teaching load
warranted.
In the instant case the facts do not meet either of these
two conditions.

The Organic Chemistry courses which the grievant

"developed", though new to this Employer, were essentially the
same courses which the grievant had previously developed and
taught during her prior employment at the University of
Connecticut.

They were not "developed" ab initio for the grievant'is

new teaching assignment with the Employer, but, by her own testimony were updated and appropriately adjusted for her new job.

As

such I cannot find that they were "newly developed" courses within the meaning of Article VIII P of the contract which would require or justify time off in the form of a reduced load during
the academic year.

Additionally, and again undisputed is that

the grievant "prepared" the courses not during the active academic
year when she would have had other teaching and academic duties,

-3but over the summer of 1977 between completion of her duties at
the University of Connecticut and the assumption of her new
teaching job with the Employer.

She is commended for using her

own time to prepare for the new courses, but that is not unusual
for faculty.

However, under that circumstance there was and is

no "conflict of time" between regular teaching and academic
duties and the development of a new course as contemplated by
Article VIII P and on which the provision for a reduced load is
based.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Employer did not violate Article VIII
P of the contract by failing to grant compensatory time to Dr. Nina Stein in connection with Organic Chemistry CH200 and Organic
Chemistry CH210.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 24, 1978
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 24th day of July, 1978, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
District 15 IAMAW

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 1235 77

and
Bright Star Industries

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer improperly assign work
to the Blue Seal Fireman on the weekend
of May 28 through May 30, 1977 as alleged
in the grievance dated May 31, 1977? If
so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on January 16, 1978 at which time
representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The work referred to in the stipulated issue involved
the removal and installation of a water feed pump in the boiler
room.

The Union has not established that this work belongs ex-

clusively to the Maintenance Man A classification or that it has
been exclusively performed by the grievant as part of his plumbing duties.
Undisputedly, the work involved constituted the "maintenance

of

boiler feed pumps

" in the boiler plant.

That work is explicitly part of the job description of the Blue

-2-

Seal Fireman.
The job description, which includes these duties was
promulgated by the Employer and submitted to the Union when the
Firemen were added to the bargaining unit in 1976, and the Union
raised no objection to the ennumerated job responsibilities of
that classification.

Moreover, the record clearly discloses

that historically, before the Firemen were added to the bargaining unit, both the Fireman and the Maintenance Man A performed
that type of work.
Accordingly, the best the Union has been able to establish is that by job description and past practice, both classifications can be and have been assigned to the work in question,
In short, the Employer may assign either or both.

Hence the

assignment of the work to the Fireman on the weekend in question
was not improper.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitration,
and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the parties makes the following AWARD:
The Employer did not improperly assign
work to the Blue Seal Fireman on the
weekend of May 28 through May 30, 1977
as alleged in the grievance dated May
31, 1977.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

-3DATED: January 23, 1978
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty third day of January, 1978, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

American Arbitration Association
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
UNITY LODGE, LOCAL 405 UAW
and

CHANDLER EVANS, INC.

CASE NUMBER:

12 30 0222 77
AWARD OF ARBITRATOR

T
IH
. HE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR(S), having been designated in
accordance with the arbitration agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated
March 26, 1977
and having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows:

I am persuaded that the Strike Settlement Proposal of March
24, 1977 sets forth the exclusive and independent procedure
for the return of employees to active employment following
the strike. By its own terms it is referred to as "the full,
precise and complete set of terms and conditions which the
Company and the Union Committee have agreed would be presented
to the Union membership...." (emphasis supplied). One of its
introductory WHEREAS clauses states that if ratified, the
Proposed Settlement "would ...resolve all outstanding issues
and establish the procedure and methods by which the striking
employees would be recalled to work...." (emphasis supplied)
I conclude therefore that for the purpose of return to work
following the strike the Settlement Proposal (which was ratified)
did not incorporate, and was not conditioned upon the superseniority provisions of Article VII, Section 3(a) of the
Arbitrator's signature (dated)

STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this

f ss .
j
day of

,19

, before me personally

came and appeared
to me known and known to me to be the individual(s) described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FORM L14-AAA-24M-5-77
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collective bargaining agreement. That contract section
was well within the contemplation of the parties when
the Settlement Proposal was negotiated. Had they intended
it to be applicable to the recall procedures of the
Proposal, they could,and in my view should have so provided. That ±hey did not( as well as the acknowledged fact
that they never even discussed the question), but rather
characterized the Settlement Proposal as "full, complete
and precise" means to my mind that for the return to work
and the establishment of a preferential hiring list following the strike, Article VII, Section 3(a) of the contract
was preempted and superceded by the Settlement Proposal.
Accordingly the Company did not violate the contract when,
following the strike, it recalled employees pursuant to
their "natural" seniority. The Union's grievance relating
to the recall of Union officers, Trustees, Skilled Trades
Chairman, Vice Chairman and Secretary of the Skilled Trades,
members of the Negotiating Committee, members of the Executive Board, Chief Stewards, Stewards, following the end
of the strike on March 26, 1977, is denied.

Dated: April 15, 1978
Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

State of New York
County of Bronx

ss<:

On this 15th day of April 1978 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz, to me known and known
to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that
he executied the same.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters of Cohoes
Local 2562

INTERIM AWARD
Case #A-78-ll

and
City of Cohoes

The stipulated issue is:
Is the City in violation of Article
17 Section E of the collective bargaining agreement by its alleged
failure to provide Emergency Medical
Technician (EMT) training and failing
to staff the ambulance with EMT personnel?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in the City Hall of Cohoes, New York on
August 8, 1978 at which time representatives of the City and Union
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

During the course of the hearing the Union and the City
reached an agreement in partial settlement of the Union's grievance.

At their request I make that agreement my INTERIM AWARD

as follows:
Firefighter Wilfred Hebert will voluntarily
transfer to the fourth or first platoon,
with a preference for the fourth platoon,
but with the understanding that the assignment is to be determined by the Fire Chief.
In manning the ambulance on overtime, or
where a platoon does not have an EMT firefighter as part of that platoon, priority
in assignment will be given to a qualified

-2EMT firefighter on the basis of seniority.
Said overtime opportunities for EMT firefighters shall be rotated to afford each
relatively equal amounts of overtime. This
procedure of according priority to EMT firefighters will continue until sufficient EMT
firefighters are trained and certified, at
which time adequate EMT coverage shall be
maintained on a regularly scheduled basis
as provided in the contract.
The Undersigned retains jurisdiction on the
balance of the grievance and the stipulated
issue, for further interim awards and/or a
final award, pending the outcome of further
discussions between the Union and the City.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 9, 1978
STATE OF: New York )q q *
COUNTY OF: New York ) B t ) -On this ninth day of August, 1978, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between

I
Uniformed Firefighters of Cohoes
Local 2562

INTERIM AWARD
Case #A-78-ll

and
City of Cohoes

The stipulated issue is:

1

Is the City in violation of Article
17 Section E of the collective bargaining agreement by its alleged
failure to provide Emergency Medical
Technician (EMT) training and failing
to staff the ambulance with EMT personnel?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in the City Hall of Cohoes, New York on
August 8, 1978 at which time representatives of the City and Union
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

During the course of the hearing the Union and the City
reached an agreement in partial settlement of the Union's grievance.

At their request I make that agreement my INTERIM AWARD

jj
\s follows:
Firefighter Wilfred Hebert will voluntarily
transfer to the fourth or first platoon,
with a preference for the fourth platoon,
but with the understanding that the assignment is to be determined by the Fire Chief.
In manning the ambulance on overtime, or
where a platoon does not have an EMT firefighter as part of that platoon, priority
in assignment will be given to a qualified

-2EMT firefighter on the basis of seniority.
Said overtime opportunities for EMT firefighters shall be rotated to afford each
relatively equal amounts of overtime. This
procedure of according priority to EMT firefighters will continue until sufficient EMT
firefighters are trained and certified, at
which time adequate EMT coverage shall be
maintained on a regularly scheduled basis
as provided in the contract.
The Undersigned retains jurisdiction on the
balance of the grievance and the stipulated
issue, for further interim awards and/or a
final award, pending the outcome of further
discussions between the Union and the City.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 9, 1978
STATE OF: New York )
COUNTY OF: New York ) & 0 -'

Q Q

•

On this ninth day of August, 1978, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters of Cohoes
Local 2562

AWARD
Case #A-78-ll

and
!

City of Cohoes

Following my Interim Award of August 9th, 1978, the above
named parties reached a settlement of the remaining issues in
dispute in this proceeding.

At the joint request of the parties,

and in conjunction with said Interim-Award, I make that settlement my Award as follows:

1.

EMT training will commence in September of 1978
provided by the State of New York. Four members
of the Fire Department, specifically the four
ambulance drivels (one from each platoon) will take
this training at a State offered course outside of
the City of Cohoes at the cost and expense of the
City.

2.

A recertification course for former EMT trained
personnel whose certification has expired within the last year, will also be given in September
of 1978. At the discretion of the Fire Chief,
bearing in mind problems with manning and overtime,
as many former EMTs as possible will be sent to
this recertification course at the cost and expense
of the City.

3.

The City is presently negotiating with the County
of Albany and the New York State Department of
Transportation which may result in the City receiving
a substantial grant in order to provide ambulance
and emergency medical care training for all employees
of the Fire Department. In the event the City is
awarded this grant, the training provided thereunder
will be mandatory for all ambulance list personnel

-2and will be available to all other members
of the Department. Pending the completion
of negotiations concerning this grant or in
the event the grant is not awarded, four men
(preferably one from each platoon) at the
discretion of the Fire Chief, will be sent at
the cost and expense of the City, to each new
EMT training course provided by the State of
New York in locations acceptable to the City
of Cohoes firefighters. It is anticipated that

such training will be offered in the Capital
District area approximately three times per
year. Such training provision is to continue
until either (1) sufficient EMTs are trained
to meet the manning requirements of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement with respect to the ambulance,
or (2) training is commenced under the aforementioned
grant from the Department of Transportation.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 18, 1978
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) " *
On this eighteenth day of September, 1978, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, ADMINISTRATOR
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters of Cohoes
Local 2562

AWARD
Case #A-78-ll

and
City of Cohoes

Following my Interim Award of August 9th, 1978, the above
named parties reached a settlement of the remaining issues in
dispute in this proceeding.

At the joint request of the parties,

and in conjunction with said Interim Award, I make that settlement my Award as follows:

EMT training will commence in September of 1978
provided by the State of New York. Four members
of the Fire Department, specifically the four
ambulance drivels (one from each platoon) will take
this training at a State offered course outside of
the City of Cohoes at the cost and expense of the
City.
A recertification course for former EMT trained
personnel whose certification has expired within the last year, will also be given in September
of 1978. At the discretion of the Fire Chief,
bearing in mind problems with manning and overtime,
as many former EMTs as possible will be sent to
this recertification course at the cost and expense
of the City.
The City is presently negotiating with the County
of Albany and the New York State Department of
Transportation which may result in the City receiving
a substantial grant in order to provide ambulance
and emergency medical care training for all employees
of the Fire Department. In the event the City is
awarded this grant, the training provided thereunder
will be mandatory for all ambulance list personnel

-2and will be available to all other members
of the Department. Pending the completion
of negotiations concerning this grant or in
the event the grant is not awarded, four men
(preferably one from each platoon) at the
discretion of the Fire Chief, will be sent at
the cost and expense of the City, to each new
EMT training course provided by the State of
New York in locations acceptable to the City
of Cohoes firefighters. It is anticipated that
such training will be offered in the Capital
District area approximately three times per
year. Such training provision is to continue
until either (1) sufficient EMTs are trained
to meet the manning requirements of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement with respect to the ambulance,
or (2) training is commenced under the aforementioned
grant from the Department of Transportation,,

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 18, 1978
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )
On this eighteenth day of September, 1978, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

CITY OF COHOES
CITY HALL,
COHOES, NEW YORK 12O47
JAMES D. HARRINGTON
Corporation Counsel

Phone:

231-1811

February 5, 1979
Eric J. Schmertz, P.C.
Chanin Building
122 West 42nd St.
New York, N. Y. 10017
Re:

Local #2562 IAFF and City of Cohoes
EMT Grievance.

Dear Mr. Schmertz:
The Union has raised the additional questions as we previously advised you, of back pay for Hebert and the other two
qualified EMTs from the date the grievance was filed to the date
of your award. Enclosed herewith is a copy of what the City and
Union agrees to be the time, hours, and amounts of money in
ques t ion.
Both the City and Union are submitting to you this date
our respective reasons why, on the City's part, no back benefits
should be paid and why, on the Union's part, back benefits in
all or part of the amount set forth in the City's attachment
should be paid.
Further in question is the following

issue:

It had been the p r a c t i c e of the City to allow firemen to
work during their vacations. James Keefe, one of the three
qualified EMTs, when he went on vacation in December of 1978,
requested permission to work, not his vacation, but just his
regular EMT rotation as he acquired pursuant to your first
interim award herein. He was refused the work. The Union now
contends that Keefe was entitled to work his rotation days and
is entitled to be paid for not having worked those days since
the City's denial constituted a contradiction to your award.
The City's position is that he is not entitled to such money.
With respect to the first issue, the back pay, the City's
position is as follows:
The grievance of the Union, a copy of which is Attachment B,
under the adjustment desired by the Union committee, there is no
mention of back pay or benefits.
The Union desires adjustment
only in the nature of, were this a question in the civil courts
of this state, a declaratory judgment accomplished by an injunction
requiring the City to perform certain duties as set up in the
declaration.
There is absolutely no request in the grievance

Eric J. Schmertz, P.C.
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filed February 20, 1978 for back pay for Hebert or any other
firefighters and on this basis the City maintains that such
request for back pay exceeds the scope of the grievance and is
not within your jurisdiction as arbitrator.
With respect to Keefe's vacation pay, the amount of money
I do not believe is in question.
It is my understanding that
we are discussing the sum of $546.48, however, the City's argument will make the question of how much money irrelevant.
In the first place, the City's practice has been, if it
is allowing a firefighter to work at all during his vacation,
to require him to work the entire week and not just to select
portions of that week to work.
Secondly, the City has not always allowed firefighters to
work their vacation on request, tut only when the vacationing
man is needed to meet "manning" requirements. Furthermore, your
award provides that EMT certified firefighters would rotate duty
so that at least one EMT would be on duty at all times. Your
award did not say that the only EMTs who could be included in
that rotation were the three that were qualified at the time the
award was rendered, nor did your award require the work to be
split into three equal parts. Having regard for vacation, so long
as there was an EMT on duty at all times, which I am advised
there was, there was no violation of your award. Furthermore,
the question of vacation work is not really within the scope of
either the grievance of February 20, 1978 nor of your award and
is thus outside of your jurisdiction to decide.
This completes the City's arguments with respect to the
above matters, however, I wish to reply to Mr. Keefe's letter
to you of January 16, 1979 and your response thereto on January
30, 1979.
I have consulted with the Board of Estimate and
Apportionment of the City of Cohoes who are the contracting
authority for the City with respect to union negotiations, etc.
With respect to your acting as permanent arbitrator of grievances
with respect to collective bargaining agreement currently in
existence between the City and Local 2562 IAFF, the City is not
willing that one arbitrator sit on a permanent basis to hear all
grievances and wishes to follow the contract procedure which
would require a submission to PERB of each and every grievance
if the parties cannot agree.
Inasmuch as this is the City's position, I believe it would
be impossible for you to serve in the capacity requested by the
Union, however, for the Union's benefit our collective bargaining
agreement provides for a tripartite arbitration panel and absent
any conflict on your part the Union would certainly be free to
select you as their third of the panel.

Eric J. Schmertz, P.C.
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Thanking you for your kind attention, I remain

Very truly

yours,

SARAH van LEER
Deputy Corporation Counsel

SVL:BL
Enc s .
cc/James Keefe

,v
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BETWEEN
IAFF LOCAL
Union Name ___ UNIFORM FIREFIGHTERS OF CQHQES..'

No.

CHARTERED BY

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS AFL-CIO
'NEW YORK STATE FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION AFL-CIO

State

<lJLt:y-.
Request No.,.........L_....._ Fiom

HEW YORK

Departmeat

The following complaint outlined below or on a separate sheet attached hereto has been submitted for investigation by:
Empl ,No.3£.<L.P.ll;..

Rank .«J!IRBEIGJH1EB_......._.

Please consider and advise regarding disposition for proper settlement.
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Name of Union Committee..
City Manager's reply
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B. Hebert's Grievance
3/3
3/4
3/7
3/18
4/2

4/3
4/3
4/4
4/5
4/6
4/13
4/20
4/21
4/30
5/3
5/4
5/5
5/12
5/13
5/14
5/15
5/16
5/20
5/21
5/23
5/24
5/28

Kehn
Pucci
Wa I ton
Shea
Pucci
Plasse
Shea
Weir
Weir
Rouche
Kehn
Greene
LaHue
Rouche
Walton
Pucci
Pucci
Pucci
Pucci
Darwak
Pucci
Rouche
Pucci
Lahue
Lahue
Rouche

LaHue

-

Retroactive overtime

10 hrs
10 hrs
10 hrs
13',hrs
10 hrs
5 hrs
4'jhrs
10 hrs
14 hrs
14 hrs
14 hrs
14 hrs
10 hrs
14 hrs
4*ihrs
10 hrs
14 hrs
10 hrs
14 hrs
14 hrs
10 hrs
14 hrs
10 hrs
14 hrs
10 hrs
14 hrs
10 hrs

Total hours:

604-i hrs.

Time and a half: 8.23 per hourTotal overtime:$5,005.26 • - .
$1,668,42 per man ( 3 BIT)

5/29 Rouche
5/29 Pucci
5/30 Darwak
5/30 Greene.
5/31 Pucci
6/1
Rouche
Walton
6/1
Walton
6/3
6/4 Walton
6/6
Rouche
6/7
Darwak
6/11 La Hue'
6/14 Pucci
6/15 Kchn
6/16 Pucci
6/16 Kehn
6/17 Rouche
6/21 Kehn
7/2
Weir
7/3
Greene
7/17 Weir
7/22 Darwak
7/24 Shea
7/26 Puce i
7/27 Walton
8/4
Darwak
8/10 Kehn

10 hrs.
14 hrs.
2'i hrs
2', hrs.
10 hrs.
14 hrs.
14 hrs.
10 hrs.
14 hrs.
10 hrs.
14 Hrs.
1.4 hrs.
14 hrs.
10 hrs.
10 hrs.
14 hrs.
14 hrs.
14 hrs.
14 hrs.
10 hrs.
10 hrs.
10 hrs.
10 hrs.
10 hrs.
14 hrs.
10 hrs.
10 hrs.

UNIFORM FIREFIGHTERS OF COHOES
LOCAL 2562 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS
COHOES, NEW YORK 12047
TELEPHONE: 237-2211

SEC'Y.

PRES.

LONGTIN

KEEPS

TREAS.

BRESSETTE
February 3, 1979

TO:

Mr. Eric J. Schmertz
122 East /;2nd Street
New York, N.Y. 1001?

Dear Mr. Schmertz,
I'm enclosing the Union's statements on the two unresolved
questions dealing with the original EOT/Ambulance Grievance, The
City is also sending statements on both these issues.
Tie wish you would revies each subject and issue a decision
in each case. If you find it necessary to meet and hear both
sides, please schedule a hearing date.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
/!

£_ %~*£-^

wames Kaefe, Sec
/Local 2562, IAFP
End

STATEMENT OP ISSUE
SMT ROTATION PAY
ADDENDUM TO
INTERIM AWARD
Case # A-78-11
Matter of Arbitration
between
UFFC Local 2%2 IAPP
and

CITY OP COHOES

The above stated issue is a direct result of the Arbitrator's
award of Aug. 9> 1978

on the above case»

The award clearly states

"Said overtime opportunities for EMT firefighters shall be rotated
to afford each relatively equal amounts of overtime."
In December T78, Pirefighter/EMT James1 Keefe was scheduled for
his vacation period,,

Weeks prior to this vacation period, Keefe

requested to be allowed to work his vacation.

At that time, the

Fire Chief stated he did not know if it was legal.

Keefe stated

that firefighters had been allowed and even requested to work their
vacations in the past.

He also mentioned that the contract is

silent as to the working of vacations so past practice and the
Chief's authority would permit it.

The Chief said he would like

to have him work the vacation period but would have to check on it.
After a week passed with no answer, Pirefighter Keefe approached
the Fire Chief for his decision.

Keefe was told he did not check on

the matter but felt he could not let him work.

At that time, Keefe

stated the contract may be silent regarding vacations, but the recent
Arbitrator's award directs EMT overtime to rotate to provide equality.
Since it would require overtime to replace Keefe while on vacation,
he stated he would pass the working of his vacation but wanted to

be called for his EMT overtime rotation as directed by the award
(the monetary value would be the same)«,

The Chief again refused.

Keefe went on vacation and was by-passed for his normal overtime
rotation for EMT on the ambulance.
Shortly after Keefe returned from vacation, Firefighter/EMT
Hebert was scheduled to go on vacation.

Prior to the taking of

Hebert1 s; vacation, the Fire Chief approached him and asked if he
would be available for his EMT overtime recall while on vacation,,
Firefighter Hebert replied he would not be available.
As the Arbitrator requested, the City and the Union met to
disciiss this matter.

The City stated they saw no objection to

paying Keefe for the overtime denied him, but would check with
the Fire Chief.

The Fire Chief stated he saw no objection if

the City paid him.

On the 31st of January, the City was contacted

for the final decision which turned out to be "No payment".
The issue and background information regarding this question
were fully discussed by the parties involved.

We believe both

parties will require the arbitrator to rule on the matter.

STATEMENT OP ISSUE
RETROACTIVE EMT OVERTIME
ADDENDUM TO
INTERIM AWARD
Case # A-78-11
Matter of Arbitration
between
UPFC Local 2562 IAPP
and
CITY OP COHOES

Firefighter/EMT Hebert approached the officers of the Local
in early January of '78 with the complaint that shortly after
caused him to file the subject grievance.
the contract was not being followed.

At that time, he stated

The City was not providing

the required EMT training and present department EMT'a were not
being used as directed.

The result was the EMT's were working

the Ambulance on their platoon assignment but were being replaced,
by unqualified (untrained) individuals when an overtime assignment
was needed.

This policy of disregarding trained firefighters

caused EMT's considerable loss of overtime.

These firefighters:

devoted much time and effort on their own to obtain the training
needed to perform their duty assignment on the Ambulance as outlined by our contract, yet individuals who would not take the time
to train were receiving the benefits.

Our Local officers agreed

with Hebert and he was referred to the GrievanceCommittee to
initiate action to correct the situation and which finally resulted
in the established policy of assigning EMT's to the ambulance.
As seen at the initial grievance hearing, the settlement
was rather easily obtained through mutual agreement after consulting
the contract and a discussion of the issue.

Since the City requires

all grievances (which result in the expenditure of funds) to go

through the arbitration process, much time is lost which extends
the problem area throughout this process.

This action not only

extends the contract violation, but also multiplies the cost
of settlement.

This subject matter took a period, of 6 months.

Firefighter Hebert recognized the violation and realized
the loss of overtime funds he was suffering due to the violation
in Jan '?8, and, after consulting with the Local, grieved the
matter in February.

This process was extended through Aughst

of that year by the City refusing to change policy until directed
to do so by an Arbitrator.

Throughout that period, ambulance

overtime was required on many occasions and EMT's were continually
placed below those who were not qualified for the position.

Over

the period of months, February thru August, this accumulated to a
considerable monetary loss to our trained EMT's.
of this action is $£,00^.26 or $l,668.ij.2 per EMT.

The total amount
This figure

was obtained from Fire Dept. records and is fully agreed upon by
both the City and. the Union.

The figure: isn't disputed, but the

payment is.
The Local maintains the following:
1)

Upon initiating this grievance, a sincere effort was

made by the Local to resolve this issue which would have resulted
in a timely settlement and a small monetary payment to our EMT's.
It was through the City's extension of the grievance process that
caused the settlement costs to grow.
2)

The City has stated its agreement with the provisions of

the Arbitrator's award and found no trouble following its directives,
yet these established provisions are simply a repeated listing of
the Union's original proposals for the initial settlement x^hich was

made months prior to the award date.

The time factor required

for the Arbitrator to issue his directives was not required for
settlement, but was desired by the City.

This resulted in the

extended loss of overtime' monies to our BMT's.
3)

In all cases where contract violations have been found

and individuals have suffered a loss of either funds or benefits,
those funds were restored to the individual who suffered the loss.
This statement can be supported from our own grievance files.
Although the amount in this case is considerable, the principal
is the same.

EMT Firefighters have suffered a loss due to

contract provisions not having been followed.
ij.)

The Union desires the monetary amount stated be divided

equally among the Dept. EMT'3 who were state certified during
that period of time, thus providing equal compensatory payment
to those qualified individuals who %%rere passed over
ambulance (EM1) overtime was required.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
UAW Local 376

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 30 0384 77

and
Colt Industries, Firearms Division

The stipulated issue is:
Is it a violation of the contract for the
Company to change the overtime scheduled
for a Saturday, by notice to the employees
so scheduled after the lunch period on
Friday? If so what should be the remedy?
(It is stipulated that the Arbitrator's
Award will cover grievances 76-709, 77198 and 77-226).
A hearing was held in Hartford, Connecticut on April 24, 1978
at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
This case involves interpretation and application of Article
V Section 5 of the contract which reads:
When practicable, the Company will give
notice of weekend overtime requirements before the end of the shift which starts fortyeight (48) hours before the start of the required overtime period provided that the Company
may, without penalty, cancel such notice at any
time before the end of the lunch period on the
day preceding the scheduled overtime work. If
such notice is cancelled at any time thereafter,
the Company will pay each employee affected for
their scheduled hours up to a maximum of eight

-2(8) hours pay at the appropriate rate in
accordance with Article V, Sections 1 and
2 unless the reason for such cancellation
is beyond the control of the Company.
The basic facts are not in dispute.

In all three grievances

the Company scheduled eight hours of overtime for a Saturday.

In

grievance 76-709 the scheduled employees were informed by the
Company after lunch on Friday afternoon that the overtime would
be six hours in duration rather than eight.

In the other two

grievances the affected employees were told on Saturday morning
after they punched in that the overtime would be six hours rather
than eight.
It is the Union's contention that the Company's action in
all three instances constituted a "cancellation" of the overtime
subsequent to the lunch period on the day preceding, within the
meaning of the last sentence of Article V Section 5.
It is the Company's position that its action changed the
scheduled overtime but did not cancel it within the contractual
proscription.
When Article V Section 5 was negotiated and the word
"cancelled" used therein, it was well within the expectation and
contemplation of the parties that scheduled Saturday overtime
might be reduced in quantity or otherwise changed from its original
schedule.

Yet the parties did not include within Article V Section

5 the possibility of notice by the Company to the scheduled employees
subsequent to the lunch period of the preceding day of a "reduction", "change" or "modification" by use of any or all of those

-3-

words.

Instead they used the single word "cancelled."

The issue

therefore narrows to whether the word "cancelled" should be interpreted to include changes, modifications or, as in this case,
a reduction in the quantity of the scheduled overtime.

I con-

clude that it should not be so interpreted.
It is axiomatic that ordinary language is to be given its
ordinary meaning.

The dictionary definition of cancelled is to

"cross out, strike out the whole, to delete, to annul or make
void, invalidate or recall." (Underscoring supplied) Webster's
New College Dictionary.
The Union argues that what the Company did was to "cancel"
the eight hours of scheduled overtime and then to promulgate a
new schedule of six hours of overtime in its place.
strained and artificial interpretation.

This is a

The word "scheduled"

refers, in my view, principally to the fact that overtime is to
be worked on a particular Saturday, and not to the precise
quantity of that overtime.
What the Company did does not meet the dictionary definition
of "cancelled."

It did not delete or revoke the whole, nor did

it void or invalidate it.

In ordinary terms it reduced the

quantity of the scheduled overtime from eight to six hours.
Article V Section 5 restricts the Company from cancelling
previously scheduled overtime by notice subsequent to the lunch
period of the preceding day but it does not prohibit or restrict
the Company from reducing the amount of scheduled overtime.

If

-4the Union wishes to prohibit or restrict reductions or other
changes in the scheduled overtime short of cancellation, subsequent to the lunch period of the preceding day, that is a matter
for negotiations and not for arbitration.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
Based on the facts in grievances 76-709,
77-198, and 77-226, it was not a violation of the contract for the Company to
change the overtime scheduled for a
Saturday, by notice to the employees so
scheduled after the lunch period on Friday.
Union grievances 76-709, 77-198 and 77-226
are denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May
STATE OF:
COUNTY OF:

1978

On this
day of May, 1978, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
IBEW, Local 457

A W A R D
Case #1230 0161 78

and
Connecticut Light & Power Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Salvatore Scavotto? If not what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were held in Meriden, Connecticut on September 20th
and November 13th, 1978 at which time Mr. Scavotto and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived in writing.
During the course of the second hearing on November 13, 1978,
and during a period thereafter the above named parties, with the
assistance of the Arbitrator reached a stipulated settlement of
the issues in dispute which is agreeable to and accepted by Mr.
Scavotto.
At the request of the parties I make said stipulated settlement my AWARD, as follows:
1. The record to date at the hearing establishes a prima
facie case for just cause to terminate the grievant due to unsatisfactory work performance as Operating Records Clerk A.
2. Further hearings are held in abeyance and the arbitrator
will retain jurisdiction in accordance with the following
conditions:
a. Grievant will be reinstated to the position
of Business Office Representative B at Enfield,
without back pay, but without loss of seniority
and without a break in services and at a red

-2circled rate of $220 a week. Said rate shall
be increased by the amount of increase for
Labor Grade 6 resulting from collective bargaining negotiations.
b. In filling bargaining unit positions at the
proposed Tolland Service Center, Article 7,
Paragraph 2 of the collective bargaining agreement shall apply equally to the grievant as to
other bargaining unit employees at Enfield.
The grievant will be precluded from bidding on
a future vacancy in the position of operating
records clerk and from bumping into such a
position in the event of a layoff.
c. Any time after sixty (60) days from the date
of reinstatement of the grievant pursuant to
paragraph a. above, the Company may reopen the
hearing if it claims that the grievant!s work
performance in the position of Business Office
Representative is unsatisfactory. In that event,
the hearing will be resumed from the point at which
it was adjourned, with each party going forward to
complete its case, the Union having the opportunity
to overcome the Company's prima facie case. Upon
such record, the arbitrator will determine the
original discharge of the grievant on its merits.
d. In consideration of the above, the grievant
agrees that he shall voluntarily retire effective December 1, 1981 unless at the option of the
Company, and with the grievant's concurrence, he
is continued in his employment after said date.
3. The arbitrator will retain jurisdiction of this case
for the purposes as described in paragraph c above and to resolve any dispute that might arise with respect to the application of Article 7, Paragraph 2 in the event of the transfer of
the grievant to the Tolland Service Center.

DATE: January 8, 1979
STATE OF: New York )
COUNTY OF: New York )ss':

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this 8th day of January, 1979, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture
Technicians, IATSE

Laboratory

AWARD

and
Criterion Film Laboratories, Inc.

The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties at a hearing
on January 11, 1978, makes the following AWARD:
For the period January 1, 1976 through
March 31, 1977 Criterion Film Laboratories,
Inc. is delinquent in payment to and owes
the Local 702 Welfare and Pension Funds
the total sum of $2,020.
Criterion Film Laboratories is directed
to pay said amount to said Funds forthwith with statutory interest.
The Arbitrator's fee of $300 shall be
borne by Criterion Film Laboratories,
Inc. Therefore Criterion Film Laboratories,
Inc. shall also pay forthwith to said Funds
the sum of $300 as reimbursement for the
payment by said Funds of said Arbitrator's
fee.

DATED: January 13, 1978
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this thirteenth day of January, 1978 before me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Deer Park Teachers' Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case # 1739 0199 77

and
Deer Park Board of Education

In accordance with the applicable arbitration provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement between Deer Park Teachers'
Association, hereinafter referred to as the "Association" and
Deer Park Board of Education, hereinafter referred to as the
"District", the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the District violate Article VII Section
9 of the Agreement in connection with the
life insurance policy obtained by the District?
If so what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held at the offices of the District on
January 19th and March 8th, 1978, at which time representatives
of the Association and District appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Article VII Section 9 of the Agreement reads:
Other Insurance
For each fiscal year commencing July 1, 1976
and ending June 30, 1979 the Board will expend the sum of $111,000.00 for partial payment of an insurance program fully processed
by the Board, approved by the Deer Park Teachers'
Association, exclusively for the benefit of
employees in the appropriate unit as defined
in Article 1 hereof.

-2-

No doubt the parties know the well settled rule that the
Arbitrator is bound to the contract terms which the parties have
negotiated.

Article VII Section 9 requires that an insurance

program processed by the District be "approved by the Deer Park
Teachers' Association...."

This requirement of approval by the

Association is unconditional.

The contract language does not

provide that the District shall make a reasonable effort to obtain
the Association's approval; nor does it call for the District to
make its best effort to obtain the Association's approval; nor
does it permit the District to unilaterally install an insurance
plan without the Association's approval.
mandatory.

Rather, the language is

It mandates the threshold approval by the Association

of any insurance program processed by the District.

I agree, as

the District contends in the instant case, that while awaiting
Association approval an insurance policy or plan may lapse thereby
endangering employee benefits and coverage.

But that is nothing

more than a consequence and reflection of the unconditional
language negotiated by the parties in Section 9, and if it is a
danger, it is a matter which must be dealt with in bargaining not
by arbitration.
In the instant case there is no dispute that the life
insurance plan adopted and implemented by the District was not
approved by the Association.

As I see it, under the language of

Article VII Section 9 the Association's approval of that life insurance program is a mandated threshold requirement unless there

-3has been waiver of that right of approval or the Association has
withheld its approval arbitrarily or unreasonably0
ception is present in the instant case.
practice nor in

Neither ex-

Clearly, neither by

dealings between the parties over the instant

disputed life insurance plan did the Association waive its right
of approval.

In fact, it is stipulated, that in prior years,

the Association initiated investigations for various available
insurance plans, selected the plan it desired, negotiated its
terms and conditions with the brokers and generally "ran the
insurance program" (except for Blue Cross, Blue Shield and Major
Medical) with the subsequent adoption and approval of the Board
of Education.

In the instant case the Association does not

challenge the District's right to now seek out a life insurance
plan and to undertake various transactions necessary to bring
that plan to the point of acceptance by the District.

But un-

questionably throughout this grievance, the Association reserved
its contractual right to approve the plan which the Board proposed
So there has been no waiver of that right.
Nor do I find that the Association withheld its approval
unreasonably

despite the short period of time between the negoti-

ations for a new life insurance plan and the expiration of the
grace period of the prior policy.

Indeed I find that both sides

acted reasonably and in good faith, but that they legitimately
disagreed over the type of plan to be bought, its cost, and the
scope of its coverageo

Additionally and unfortunately

there were

-4failures in communication between the District and the Association
due to vacations and to the routing of mail.

Consequently, the

parties could not agree on an insurance program and the one put
into effect by the District in order to avoid a lapse in life
insurance coverage was simply not a plan approved by the Association as required by Article VII Section 9 of the contract.

That

the District acted in good faith to get a plan into effect before
the expiration of the old policy, is both understandable and
commendable, but in the face of the unconditional

language of

Article VII Section 9 it did not meet the contractual requirement
of Association approval.

Nor can approval be implied or construct-

ed from the District's letter to the President of the Association
asking for approval and stating that approval would be assumed if
there was no response within a matter of a few specified days.
Without anyone's fault, that letter never reached the Association's
President until well past the deadline and for that reason cannot
be binding.

Also, again considering the unconditional

language

of Section 9, approval must be signaled and achieved, not by negative failure to respond but by some affirmative act.

So, despite

reasonable positions and efforts by both sides, agreement was not
reached and approval was not obtained.

And without approval

Article VII Section 9 was violated.
However, in granting the grievance, and directing the
District to put into effect a life insurance plan approved by the
Association, I rule that the District need not consider a life
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insurance plan which is only applicable to and covers only the
employees in the Deer Park Teachers' Association bargaining unit.
Article VII Section 9, though clear and unequivocal on the requirement of Association approval, is ambiguous as to whether a life
insurance plan is to be restricted just to the teachers in this
bargaining unit, or may include administrators and other nonteaching personnel so long as $111,000 of the insurance

premium

is paid exclusively for the life insurance benefits for the
teachers.

An ambiguous contract section is interpreted by past

practice.

The practice in the past has been to approve and imple-

ment a life insurance policy which covered teachers, administrators
and other non-teaching personnel.

Therefore, in seeking and ob-

taining the Association's approval on a new life insurance plan to
replace the one presently effective, or in negotiations with the
Association pursuant to this decision for approval of the existing
plan, the Board may present a plan covering employees of the
District as well as the teachers of this bargaining unit provided
however that $111,000 of the premiums for that plan are solely
directed to and exclusively cover the life insurance benefits of
and for the teachers of this bargaining unit.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
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The District violated Article VII of
Section 9 of the Agreement in connection with the life insurance policy
obtained by the District. The District
is directed to obtain the approval of the
Association of a life insurance policy
applicable to employees in this bargaining
unit for the period of time covered by the
present collective bargaining agreement,
under conditions referred to in the foregoing Opinion.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 17, 1978
STATE OF New York ) ss> .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this seventeenth day of March, 1978, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed :the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
Local Lodge 1871

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance #M-565A-7

and
Electric Boat Division, General
Dynamics Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Was John Riviera denied the opportunity
to work his regular shift on Friday, April
22, 1977 in violation of the collective
bargaining agreement? If so what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held in Groton, Connecticut on October 20,
1977 at which time Mr. Riviera, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Certain post-hear-

ing material was filed.
The grievant's regular work shift is from 7:30 AM to 4:30
PM.

He worked that shift on Thursday, April 21, 1977.

he was off eight hours.

Thereafter

By prearranged scheduling he then worked

a shift beginning at 11:30 PM on April 21 and continuing until
7:30 AM on April 22nd.

When he sought to stay on and work his

regular shift beginning at 7:30 AM on April 22nd, the Company
refused to permit him to do so.
It is the Company's contention that the period from 11:30

-2PM on April 21 to 7:30 AM on April 22nd was a change in the
grievant's shift to replace his regular shift beginning at 7:30
AM on April 22nd; that this arrangement was discussed with the
grievant and he agreed to it; and that in any event the Company
has a managerial prerogative, for purposes of safety and otherwise, to disallow an employee from working sixteen

consecutive

hours.
The Company's contention that this was a "shift change" is
rejected.

Undisputedly it was not scheduled with five days

notice as- required by Article XXVIII Section 8 of the contract,
nor

has there been any showing by the Company that "conditions

....(made) such notice impossible."

Additionally it is stipulatec

that the grievant was paid at the overtime rate for those hours.
Had this been a "shift change" he would have been paid at his
straight time rate for regular shift hours of service and not at
the overtime rate.
That the grievant may have agreed to the arrangement is
immaterial, if the arrangement violated the contract, for it is
well settled that understandings between management and individual
employees are unenforceable if contrary to the contract.

The

same is true, under this contract, with regard to Management
Rights.

The exercise of managerial prerogatives are "specific-

ally limited (by) the provisions of this Agreement."
The question therefore is whether the contract expressly
preempts any contrary arrangement between the grievant and his
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foreman and/or the exercise of a management right to foreclose
sixteen consecutive working hours.

I find that the contract does

Based on the facts, I am persuaded that the shift which the
grievant worked from 11:30 PM on April 21st to 7:30 AM on April
22nd was nothing other than a prescheduled "call-in" within the
meaning of Article IX, Section 1 of the contract.
conditions of a "call-in."

It met both

As indicated, he was paid at the

overtime rate, and the hours for which he received that pay were
"outside the hours of his regular shift."

Applying the provisions

of Article X Paragraphs 5A and B, it is clear not only that the
contract contemplates continuous hours of work beyond a normal
eight hour shift, contrary to the Company's assertion herein
of its managerial prerogative on that question, but expressly
covers the instant factual situation.
reads:

Paragraph 5A and B

A. Employees required to work around the
clock and required to continue through
their regular assigned shift shall continue
to receive pay at the overtime rate for all
hours worked.
B. An employee who is called in before his
regular starting time will be granted the
opportunity of working his full regular shift
provided work is available.

While I do not find that the grievant was required to "work
around the clock and....to continue through his regular assigned
shift," I cite that contract language only to show that continuou
working hours of more than eight, and as here up to sixteen, was
not only provided for under the contract but contemplated as a
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as a possibility by the parties.
germane.

Section 5B is particularly

It expressly grants an employee the opportunity to

continue to work his full regular shift after he has completed
a call-in period immediately prior to his regular starting time.
It should be noted that there is no time limit or restriction
on the quantity of the call-in.

Hence if the call-in period,

as here, is of eight hours duration, the employee has the right
to continue on and to work his regular shift immediately following, even if it means sixteen hours of consecutive work.

There

is no showing or contention that there was not "available work"
on the grievant's subsequent regular shift hours.
Under all the foregoing circumstances the grievance on
behalf of Mr. Riviera is granted.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
John Riviera was denied the opportunity to
work his regular shift on Friday, April 22,
1977 in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The Company shall compensate
him for one shift at his regular rate of pay.

DATED: July 5, 1978
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF
)

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this fifth day of July, 1978, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Exterminators, Fumigators and
Termite Workers Union Local 155,
Service Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND
RECOMMENDATION

and
The Exterminating Industry Institute

The expired contract between the above named parties dated
February 1, 1975 through January 31, 1978 contained cost of living
escalator

clauses.

The parties are now in dispute over whether they agreed to
include or continue cost of living provisions in the current
collective bargaining agreement effective February 1, 1978 through
January 31, 1981.
A hearing was held on May 16, 1978 at which time representatives of the above named parties appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

While it is conceded by both sides that there was no
discussion of cost of living clauses during virtually the entire
period of the negotiations leading to the current agreement, the
Union contends that just prior to the conclusion of the negotiations the Employer agreed to continue in the new contract the
cost of living language and formula of Article FOURTH Section B
of the predecessor contract, with the effective and relevant dates
therein appropriately updated.
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The Employer denies any such agreement.

He contends that the

Stipulation of Settlement reflects all the issues agreed upon
and points out that the Stipulation is silent on the matter of
cost of living clauses.

The Employer acknowledges

that the

Union raised the matter of cost of living escalator provisions
"at the eleventh hour" of the negotiations, but asserts that he
rejected the Union's demand, offering instead, if the Union
wanted it, only to continue in the new contract the precise
language of Article FOURTH Section B, including the expired
effective and applicable dates set forth in the two paragraphs
thereof.
I conclude that the parties honestly misunderstood each
other on this issue.

Each had reason, albeit erroneously, to

believe that its respective position had either been accepted or
understood by the other.

In short, there simply was no "meeting

of the minds" on whether cost of living escalator clauses would
or would not be included in the current contract.
With that determination it is obvious that there is no
contract provision to be applied or interpreted and no issue of
fact that can be definitively determined in arbitration.

Also,

it is equally manifest that revision of the entire contract,
based on the "mutual mistake" of the parties over the issue of
cost of living clauses would be purposeless.
What should be done in my judgement is for the parties to
agree to a compromise recommendation from this Arbitrator.

-3Considering the good faith misunderstanding involved, the
resolution of this dispute should be on fair and equitable
grounds which reconcile the legitimate positions of both
sides.

My recommendation is that the current collective

bargaining agreement contain a cost of living escalator clause,
the applicability of which would begin to run primarily in the
second year of the contract, which would include the formula
set forth in the first paragraph of Article FOURTH Section B
of the predecessor contract, and which would, if the conditions
thereof were met, generate cost of living increases at the beginning of the third year of the contract.
Specifically I recommend that the clause to be included
in the current contract read:
Effective February 1, 1980, in the event
that the percentage increase in the cost
of living (Consumer Price Index for the
City of New York) from November 1978 to
November 1979 exceeds twelve per cent,
then, in that event, an increase of three
cents (3^) per hour for each one per cent
(1%) above twelve (12%) shall be granted.
In no event shall said increase pursuant
to this provision exceed nine cents (9<0
per hour. In computing increases in the
cost of living above twelve per cent (12%),
less than .5% shall be ignored and increases
of .5% or more shall be considered a full
point. Any increases hereunder shall be
added to the minima.

DATED: May 22, 1978

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
UAW Local 1596

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 30 0249 77
and

Fountain Plating Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreement dated October 1,
1975 through September 30, 1978 when it
failed to reinstate the striking employees
at the termination of the strike and upon
the strikers' offer to return on July 8,
1977? If so what shall be the remedy?
The Company contends that the issue is
not arbitrable.
A hearing was held in Springfield,
Massachusetts on June
.
6, 1978, at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Post-hearing briefs were filed

The arbitrability of the issue was decided by the Superior
Court of the Commenwealth of Massachusetts in its Order of
January 25, 1978 denying the Company's motion for an injunction
and referring the dispute to the arbitration forum under the
collective bargaining agreement.
Under statutory and decisional law, an employer, faced
with a lawful strike, whether at the end of a collective bargaining agreement or during its term, may permanently replace strikin g

-2employees with new hires provided replacement is accomplished
in accordance with prescribed procedures.

I know of no law or

decision, and none is cited herein, which changes this right just
because, as here, the strike occurred during the life of the
contract following an economic wage reopening and the failure of
negotiations pursuant thereto.

The contract reference to the

"right to strike" in that circumstance I deem to be merely a
recitation of the Union's statutory right.

I do not construe

it as a limitation on the Company's right to keep its operations
functioning by hiring replacements pursuant to applicable labor
law.
In the instant case there is no evidence that the Company
did not replace the strikers in accordance with procedures required by the statute and decisional law.

I find nothing in the

collective bargaining agreement which would constitute a waiver
of or a restriction or limitation on the Company's right to
replace strikers under the applicable provision of the National
Labor Relations Act as Amended and the decisions of the National
Labor Relations Board and the courts.

Nor do I find in the

contract or in the circumstances of the strike settlement, any
provision or understanding which would limit or change the effect
of any such replacement of strikers, by requiring their rehire
at the end of the strike or as a condition of the strike settlement.

Any such contract change in or modification of rights

under the National Labor Relations Act as Amended must be clear
and explicit.

I find no such clear or explicit exception, either

-3in the contract or in the evidence of the terms of the strike
settlement.

Indeed, with regard to the latter, the Company

expressly informed the Union not only that it had replaced the
strikers but that it would not terminate the replacements.
That the strikers offered to return to work created no
obligation on the part of the Company to accept that offer once
those strikers had been replaced. Any agreement on reinstatement should have been made an express part of any strike
settlement.

That no such explicit understanding was negotiated

means that no agreement on reinstatement was reached, and hence
no obligation to reinstate was created.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement when it failed to reinstate the striking employees at the termination of the strike and upon the strikers
offer to return on July 8, 1977.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
HATED: July 24, 1978
STATE OF New York )gg
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 24th day of July, 1978, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #53 30 0345 77

and
General Electric Company, Cleveland
Ohio

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article XXVIII,
Section 1, of the 1976-1979 GE-IUE
National Agreement on April 4th, 1977
when Rudolph Rom was upgraded to Work
Leader in the Bench Department rather than
Jeuel Guess? If so, what shall the remedy
be?
A hearing was held in Cleveland, Ohio on November 21, 1977
at which time Mr. Guess, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant",
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

A stenographic record of the

hearing was taken and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
Article XXVIII Section 1 reads:
Standard for filling open jobs and upgrading
The Company will, to the extent practical,
give first consideration for job openings and
upgrading to present employees, when employees
with the necessary qualifications are available.
In upgrading employees to higher rated jobs, the
Company will take into consideration as an important fact, the relative lengths of continuous

-2service of the employees who it finds are
qualified for such upgrading.
I interpreted and applied the foregoing contract section
in a prior Award, International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, Local 300, AFL-CIO and General Electric Company,
American Arbitration Association Case #15 30 0217 77, dated
October 13, 1977, involving an upgrading dispute at that Company's
Schenectady plant.
In that decision I stated:
The .... contract language, particularly the
phrase:
"....who it finds are qualified
for such upgrading." (emphasis added)
vests the Company with the unilateral and
discretionary authority to determine which
employees are qualified to be given consideration for a promotion. Of course the Company
may not abuse that discretion or exercise it
in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
In that case I upheld the Company's determination that a
senior applicant for a Group Leader job was not qualified for
promotion because he lacked requisite leadership capabilities.
I found that the facts and standards upon which the Company
based that determination WGBE sufficiently documented in the
record so as to rebut any assertion that the Company's decision
was arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.
Hence in the instant case as in the aforemention previous
decision, the issue is not whether this Arbitrator thinks the
grievant is qualified or unqualified for promotion to the VJork
Leader job in the Bench Department, but rather whether the
Company's decision that he was unqualified was so devoid of
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factual basis and so unsupported by relevant work criteria as
to be arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.
That record before me does not support a conclusion that the
Company acted without reason in an arbitrary, capricious or
discriminatory manner.

It found the grievant unqualified primar-

ily on three grounds; that he had not performed and was not
sufficiently familiar with many of the jobs in the department;
that he could not work easily and competently with prints, an
important duty of the Work Leader; and despite his thirty four
years of service in the Department, had only recently been upgraded to the A level of his classification and had not reached
the highest rate in the wage progression.
There is significant probative evidence in the record supportive of these three circumstances.

In his interview the grievant

conceded that he had worked in only eleven of the twenty three
areas of the department, and though he felt that he could perform the Work Leader duties in all of the jobs, his work history
was largely confined to "burners."

It was not disputed that

he had difficulties working with prints; indeed those difficulties
were revealed when he filled in as a Work Leader during the
vacations.

His many years in the B Assembler classification was

stipulated, as was the fact that he had moved to the A Assembler
rank, but not to the top of the wage scale at the time that the
Work Leader vacancy was posted.
Based on these facts, I am satisfied that the Company had

-4bona fide and reasonable grounds to question the grievant's
qualifications for permanent promotion to the Work Leader
position.

This is not to say that I judge the grievant to have

been unqualified; that question, as I have indicated, is not
before me.

Nor is it to draw qualification comparisons between

the grievant and Mr. Rom, who the Union concedes was qualified.
Rather it is to say that the Company based its decision on
factual and reasonable grounds, and consequently I cannot find
that its decision was arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.
That the grievant was interviewed does not mean that the
Company initially found him among those qualified.

Obviously

the interview was part of the Company's screening process to
determine threshold qualifications.

The grievant's temporary

and short term tenure, during vacation periods as a Work Leader
in the Department, is not enough to cast the Company's decision,
which is supported by other reasonable and rational facts, as
arbitrary, especially when the grievant's work as a Work Leader
revealed some of the very deficiencies upon which his instant
disqualification was based.
For all the foregoing reasons the Union's grievance is
denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
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The Company did not violate Article XXVIII,
Section 1 of the 1976-1979 GE-IUE National
Agreement on April 4, 1977 when Rudolph Rom
was upgraded to Work Leader in the Bench
Department rather than Jeuel Guess.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 27, 1972>
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this twenty seventh day of February, 1978, -'before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
IUE Local 283
Case #1130 0179 78

and

General Electric Company

CASE NUMBER:

AWARD OP ARBITRATOR

T
_Ln
.HE

U N D E R S I G N E D ARBITRATOR(s), having been designated in
accordance with the arbitration agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated
1973-1976
and having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows:

Based on the record, and as I ruled at the conclusion of
the hearing, I do not find a mutual binding agreement between the
parities that further processing of the grievances of Ralph Albanese
(Grievance 184) and John Lombard! (Grievance 192) beyond Step II
of the grievance procedure would be held in abeyance pending the
arbitration decision of Father Brown in the Edmund Carley case,
and/or that that decision would be applicable to the Albanese and
Lombardi grievances. Therefore grievance 218 was not timely
filed pursuant to Article XIII Section 2(a)(l) of the contract, and
hence is not arbitrable.
I
*

Arbitrator's signature (dated)

Eric J./Schmertz
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this
came and appeared

third

/ .
[
day of July,

Notary

Y°*
Qualified in New York County ,, cl
pommission Expires March 30, 19-/-/

, 19 78 , before me personally

Eric J. SchmertZ

to me known and known to me to be the individual(s) described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
Local 485

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0712 78

and
Howmedica, Inc. Orthopaedics Div.

The stipulated issue is:
In the event an employee's vacation
period includes a holiday designated
in the contract, does the applicable
collective bargaining agreement require that the employee receive holiday
pay and a day off, or just holiday pay?
The hearings were held on August 7 and October 17, 1978
at which time representatives of the above named Union and
Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

Post-hearing briefs were filed.

The parties agree that there is no explic it contract
language precisely covering the issue in dispute.

The past practice

to which both sides point in support of their respective but
divergent positions, is neither sufficiently uniform nor factually
relevant to be determinative one way of the other.
However I do find specific contract language, which in my
view sets forth an unmistakable intent supportive of the Union's
position herein.
Article 20 of the contract, immediately preceeding the
enumerated holidays states that those holidays "shall be observed"
(emphasis added). The last paragraph of Article 20, sets forth

-2the circumstances when an enumerated holiday "shall be celebrated I!
or'fehall be observed" when the holiday falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday; when it falls on a day especially designated by the State
of New Jersey and when two holidays fall on the same day.

The

clear language and intent of that paragraph is that the enumerated
holidays shall be celebrated or observed as days off, as well as
days for which employees receive holiday pay.

Significantly the

last sentence of that last paragraph makes the purpose abundantly
clearn, by providing that
"....there will be no decrease in the
number of days observed as holidays."

By the foregoing contract language and by the ordinary and
accepted meaning of the words "celebrated" and "observed", I am
satisfied that

except for special scheduling at premium pay as

provided, the contract intended that holidays be taken as a day
off, as well as paid for.
Applied to the issue in this case, it should be apparent
that if a holiday falls within a vacation period, and, as the
Company claims may be subsumed within the vacation, that holiday
is only paid for, but not otherwise "observed" or celebrated."
Also, for one of the vacation days to simultaneously encompass
and liquidate an enumerated holiday would, in my view, "decrease
the number of days observed as holidays" for that employee in
contravention of the spirit of the last sentence of the final
paragraph of Article 20.
Finally, it is axiomatic that a collective agreement should
not be administered in a manner to accord greater benefits to
some employees than to others similarly situated.

The Company's
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practice herein would do just that.

Those employees who, merely

by an accident of the calendar took vacations during which no
holidays fell would receive their full vacation entitlement, and
also during the rest of the year a day off (as well as pay) on
each of the enumerated holidays.

Yet those who, by chance, took .

vacations during which one or more holidays fell would receive
only their vacation period, and holiday pay, but no
for those particular holidays.

day(s) off

Depending on which way inter-

preted or approached, it would mean that the latter group

of

employees would not "celebrate" or "observe" those holidays, and
consequently would receive one or more fewer holidays off than
the former group.

Or alternatively, if those vacation days on

which the holiday(s) fell are deemed as "observed" holidays, the
latter group would have a correspondingly reduced vacation period,
or less vacation time off than those employees whose vacations
and holidays did not coincide.

I am persuaded that this inequity

was not intended by the parties, and as it comes about by sheer
accident of calendar, cannot be contractually sustained as a
justifiable distinction between the aforesaid two groups.

Accord-

ingly, when an employee's vacation period includes a holiday that
employee is entitled to both holiday pay and a day off.
If for operational and/or business reasons the Company
cannot accord an employee the holiday off as a day off tacked on
to his vacation, then the scheduling of the day off, in observation
of the holiday shall be a matter to be negotiated by the parties.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
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In the event an employee's vacation
period includes a holiday designated
in the contract, the applicable
collective bargaining agreement requires that the employee receive holiday
pay and a day off.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: December 18, 1978
STATE OF: New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF: New York )
On this eighteenth day of December, 1978, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance #77-22

Local 379, UAW
and
The Jacobs Manufacturing Company

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the Union's
Grievance #77-22 dated May 26th, 1977?
A hearing was held in Hartford, Connecticut on June 7, 1978
at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Union Grievance #77-22 reads:
The Set Up Men in Department (86) Brake
Assembly are not receiving their full
Department average bonus. They are to
be made whole from week ending 2/6/77.
Before the change which gave rise to the grievance, the
grievants were part of the Brake Assembly Department 87, and
received incentive earnings based on the average earnings of the
production employees of that Department.

Under that arrangement

Department 87 included both Brake Assembly and Brake Machine production employees and Brake Assembly and Brake Machine Setup Men.
Both categories of Setup Men received incentive earnings on exactly the same basis, namely based on the earnings of the Brake
Assembly and Brake Machine production employees.
For accounting and cost control purposes the Company changec
the numerical identification of Department 87 by dividing it into

-2Departments 86 and 87.

The Brake Assembly production employees

and the Brake Assembly Setup Men were identified with the former
and the Brake Machine production employees and the Brake Machine
Setup Men were identified with the latter.

It is undisputed that

there were no physical or operational changes in the work or
methods of any of these employees as a result of the new numbered
identification.

The Setup Men identified in Department 86, who

are the grievants in this case, continued to receive incentive
earnings on the same basis as when they were all identified with
Department 87.
The grievants, and the Union on their behalf contend that
the Brake Assembly Setup Men are entitled to incentive earnings
based on the earnings of the newly identified Department 86 and
not the combined earnings of Departments 86 and 87 (it is conceded
that the incentive earnings of the Brake Assembly employees identified with Department 86 are higher than the incentive earnings
of the Brake Machine employees identified with Department 87).
The grievance is based on Article IX (Incentive Plan)
Section 1, Paragraph 9.1.1 (d) of the contract which reads:
Each average qualified employee on standard
will be provided with the same consistent
opportunity to earn as every other employee
on standard as long as the job conditions
are similar.
It is the Union's contention that "job conditions are
similar" only as between the Brake Assembly production employees
and the Brake Assembly Setup Men, both now identified with Department 86, and that there is no similarity of job conditions between
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the work of the grievants and the Brake Machine production employees
identified with Department 87.
The Company responds that to grant the Union's grievance
would be to change the pay rates of the Brake Assembly Setup Men
in a manner that would accord them higher incentive earnings
than the Setup Men identified with Department 87; that that would
constitute a legislated change in wages beyond the terms of the
contract and hence beyond the Arbitrator's authority; and that
it would bring about an unjustified change in wages based not on
any operating or methods change but only because of a bookkeeping
change designed solely to help the Company keep better track of
its costs.
Though it was not really disputed, I nonetheless accept
the Company's testimony that Department 87 was separated into
Departments 86 and 87 in form only for accounting and cost control
purposes.

That being so, and in the absence of any physical,

operational or methods changes in the work of the four categories
of employees formerly identified with Department 87, I find no
contractual basis to change the basis of calculating incentive
earnings of both categories of Setup Men.

As a matter of long

standing practice, the Brake Assembly Setup Men and the Brake
Machine Setup Men were paid the same incentive earnings based on
the production and earnings of the Brake Assembly and Brake
Machine production employees whom they respectively serviced.
That practice established a "condition" of

job "similar(tty)"

within the meaning of Section 1 Paragraph 9.1.1 (d) of Article IX

-4of the contract.

There has been no change in the similarity of

job conditions as a result of the bookkeeping change made by the
Company in the numbering of the Department(s) involved. Accordingly, that mere change in form, in the absence of any change of
substance, is not enough to require a contractual change in the
method of payment.

That other employees receive incentive earn-

ings based exclusively on the earnings of production employees
in their respective departments adds nothing to the Union's case
Those instances, as here, are situations where by practice and
without any operational changes, incentive earnings of Setup
have been based on the productivity and earnings of the production employees in the departments where they work

. Those ex-

amples are simply a perpetuation of what has continued to exist.
The same is true in the instant case.

The work of the various

classifications involved remains the same; their locations are
the same; their methods are no different.

In short, the condi-

tions under which the Brake Assembly Setup Men have been paid
incentive earnings continue to prevail in fact, irrespective of
a bare change in the numbering of the Department.

Hence, con-

sistent with practices throughout the Company involving Setup
Men and in the implementation of Article IX over an extended
period of time, I find no grounds to change the basis for the
payment of incentive earnings to Brake Assembly Setup Men to
something different from how they had been paid all along and
different from how Brake Machine Setup Men are also paid.
Any other result would, in my judgement, be discriminatory
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It would increase the incentive earnings of Brake Assembly Setup
Men above the earnings of Brake Machine Setup Men, when historically their incentive pay was at parity.

It would do so

unsupported by any change in their work assignments or working
conditions, and hence unjustifiably.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
Union Grievance #77-22 dated May 26th, 1977
is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED:
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of July, 1978, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
United Transportation Union

OPINION AND AWARD
Case # 1339 0032 78

and
The Long Island Railroad

The above named Union and Carrier submitted to the Undersigned as Arbitrator appeals from the disciplinary trials of Ms.
P. A. Adams and Messrs. V. Petrone and J. A. Penna, and the
grievances of J. E. Norris and L. Westbrook.
At the hearing and over the Union's objection I granted
the Carrier's motion to dismiss the grievances of Norris and
Westbrook because of the failure of each to appear after due
notice.
Case of P. A. Adams
Despite the Carrier's scepticism over the veracity of the
grievant's explanation for her fifth run failure, a reading of
the record of the disciplinary trial, together with the disclosed,
albeit informal information that a previous similar incident had
occurred, leads me to consider it reasonably probable that the
grievant was prevented from coming to work by the threats and
intimidation of and probably physical force applied by her then
fiancee (and now husband).

The question before the Arbitrator

is not whether the grievant had a fifth run failure.
conceded.

That is

Rather the question is whether that failure should be
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excused.

Manifestly the Carrier cannot be bound or restricted

by difficulties employees may have in meeting their work schedules
due to marital difficulties.

On the other hand I am not per-

suaded that a single such incident, dealt with on an official
basis, should be rejected as an excuse.

In short, and based on

the particular circumstances of this case, I am not satisfied
that a woman should lose her job because her fiancee or husband's
threats or physical abuse kept her from coming to work.

If the

problem persisted, the Carrier would have no choice but to terminate the employee based on the well settled rule that chronic
absences irrespective of the cause and even if beyond the em->:^
ployee's control need not be tolerated.

Here however, at least

based on the official record, the situation had not reached that
point, and to terminate the grievant because of the threats and
probable violence of her then fiancee if she tried to go to work
would constitute an inordinate penalty.

Regardless of whether

it is within the Arbitrators' technical jurisdiction, I nonetheless take notice of the fact that there was a prior similar incident in which, undisputedly, the grievant"s fiancee physically
abused her and which caused the grievant to miss a run, but which:
because of the circumstances, the Carrier overlooked.

Having done

so, and also because the grievant had accumulated four such
relevant run failures, I consider it unfair and inequitable to
now require the Carrier grant the grievant back pay, simply because the instant fifth run failure, and not the prior incident

-3is what is officially before me.

Just as the grievant should not

be inordinately punished for the single official incident involving her fifth run failure under the circumstances present,
the Carrier too should not be penalized just because the prior
incident was not dealt with officially and was overlooked.
Accordingly it is my Award that the grievant be excused from the
instant fifth run failure and that she be reinstated but without
back pay.
Case of V. Patrone
The trial record below fully and amply supports the
charge for which

the grievant was dismissed.

Indeed, the Union

does not dispute those allegations but rather argues that the
penalty of discharge was too severe considering the grievant's
twelve years of service.

I cannot agree with the Union's position

The offense which the grievant committed is well recognized as
a dismissable offense irrespective of an employee's longevity
and prior disciplinary record.

Moreover the grievant did not

have as much longevity as some other employees whose discharges
for similar offenses were reduced to disciplinary suspensions by
other arbitrators, nor did the grievant have an unblemished or
even satisfactory prior disciplinary record.

His prior record

included disciplinary penalties for several offenses including
some clearly relevant to the principal charge for which he was
discharged.
Additionally it is undisputed that the grievant was given

-4due notice of and ample opportunity to appear at his disciplinary
trial, but failed to do so.

So I find no procedural or due

process error in the disciplinary trial.

Accordingly the dis-

charge is sustained.
Case of J. A. Penna
The grievant was discharged following a disciplinary
trial for failure to respond to the Carrier's inquiry regarding
his condition and whereabouts early in October after he had
reported off sick on September 21, 1977, and for failing to comply
with the Carrier's written instructions to report to its medical
office.

These failures constituted proper grounds for his dis-

missal.

That the grievant may have entered the military service

during the period in question is immaterial.

There is no direct

evidence that he entered the service or is presently in the
service (except that he appeared at the Carrier's office subsequent to the discharge to turn in certain Company equipment
in what a representative of the Carrier thought was a Navy
uniform).

Most importantly he did not at any time, and has not

officially notified the Carrier that he entered the service nor
did he request a military leave of absence.

Under the circum-

stances I can find no fault with the Carrier's decision to discharge him.
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator,
and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
1.

The grievances of J. E. Norris and L.
Westbrook are dismissed because of the
failure of those grievants to appear
at the arbitration hearing.

2.

Ms. P. A. Adams shall be reinstated but
without back pay.

3.

The discharge of V. Petrone is upheld.

4.

The discharge of J. A. Penna is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January
1978
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of January, 1978 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
United Federation of Teachers

OPINION AND AWARD
Case # 1330 0977 77

and
Long Island University, The
Brooklyn Center

The stipulated issue is:
Did the University violate Article VII on
page 15 of the collective bargaining agreement when it assigned June Polak to the
Brooklyn Center of Long Island University?
If so what shall the remedy be?
A hearing was held on March 13, 1978, at which time representatives of the above parties appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
The pertinent part of Article VII reads:
A. Appointments
All applicants for available classroom
positions at any rank shall be reviewed and
approved by a majority of the qualified
voters of the department....before the appointment is made.
The facts are not in dispute.

Ms. Polak, who was a faculty

member of the Brooklyn College of Pharmacy, was integrated into
and became part of the Biology Department faculty of Long Island
University, Brooklyn Center as a consequence of a merger agreement
between Long Island University and the Brooklyn College of
Pharmacy.

Under that agreement the Brooklyn College of Pharmacy
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ceased to exist as a separate entity.

Ms. Polak's assignment

was to teach students who were beginning the study of Biology
whether or not they went on to the pharmacy specialty, and also
pharmacy students.

It is undisputed that her appointment was not

"reviewed and approved by a majority of the qualified voters of
the department

"

Indeed no review or approval was undertaken.

The Union contends that the contract is clear and unequivocal
in requiring the "review and approve(al)" before any new faculty
member joins a department of the University.

It asserts that Ms.

Polak fell into that category, and that her appointment should be
voided until she has been "reviewed and approved."
The University argues that Ms. Polak was not an "applicant1
within the meaning of the foregoing contract section, nor was
there an "available classroom....position" which she filled or to
which she was appointed.

Instead, the University contends that

the integration of faculty members of the previously independent
Brooklyn College of Pharmacy into the Long Island University
Brooklyn Center pursuant to the merger agreement, merely merged
some members of an existing faculty with those already employed
by Long Island University, and that none of the former including
Ms. Polak were "applicants", nor were any of them assigned to
open or "available" classroom positions.
As I see it disposition of this case turns on the intent
of Article VII of the contract rather than on its bare language.
It is well settled that a situation may be within the "letter of
the law", but not within its spirit and intent.

I find that to
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be the case here.

I am not persuaded that the relevant sections

of Article VII were intended to cover the instant facts.

I am

satisfied, and there is no evidence to the contrary, that that
contract section was not negotiated with any contemplation of its
applicability to a merger agreement between the University and
some other independent college or institute of higher learning.
Rather, I believe that it was intended to apply to applications
by individuals who seek or

are recruited for open lines or

faculty vacancies in the various departments (or the libcary) of
the University.

In my view that intent is to be distinguished

from what took place in this case.

Here the Brooklyn College of

Pharmacy gave up its separate identity, merged its disciplines
and facilities into the University and became an integral part
of the University. To facilitate and implement that merger
several faculty members of the Brooklyn College of Pharmacy became part of the faculty of the University so that the combined
and apparently expanded Biology and Pharmacy curricula could be
maintained.

Though under that circumstance I do not construe

those teachers from the Brooklyn College of Pharmacy as constituting "applicants for available classroom .... positions", what is
controlling is that there is no evidence, irrespective of its
language, that Article VII was intended to apply to that unique and
special circumstance.

Significant to my mind, is that if Article

VII could be invoked to pass on faculty appointments of those
previously employed by the Brooklyn College of Pharmacy, the

-4departmental faculty of the University, and presumably the Union
on their behalf, could constructively and effectively veto the
merger agreement.

Clearly any such power of veto through the

exercise of the review and approval vote under Article VII
cannot be found within that contract section unless supported
by clear evidence of that purpose and intent.
Finally, I conclude that the Union is presently estopped
from objecting to Ms. Polak's appointment.

It is undisputed

that before Ms. Polak's appointment several other faculty members
from the Brooklyn College of Pharmacy became part of the faculty
of departments of the University as a result of the merger
agreement without objection from the Union and without being
subjected to the provisions of Article VII of the contract.

To

now require that Ms. Polak be reviewed and approved, with the
possibility that she might be rejected, when others who were
similarly situated have assumed University faculty positions
without objection, would be an uneven and discriminatory
application of the appointments provision of Article VII.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned
duly designated as the Arbitrator and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The University did not violate Article VII
on page 15 of the collective bargaining
agreement when it assigned June Polak to
the Brooklyn Center of Long Island University.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

-5DATED: March 20, 1978
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

On this twentieth day of March, 1978, before me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known
to me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

AMERICAN ARIBTRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 197, UAW

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1230 0141 78
and

Marlin-Rockwe11 Division of TRW, Inc.

The Union, in its grievance No. P-78-09 dated February 13,
1978 challenges and appeals the discharge of Domenic Palazzo.
A hearing was held on July 25, 1978 in Hartford, Connecticut,
at which time Mr. Palazzo, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant;"
and representatives

of the above named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Union

and Company filed post-hearing briefs.
The Company charges the grievant with sleeping on the job on
February 10, 1978.

It asserts that that offense about which the

grievant had been twice cautioned within the preceeding three weeks,
together with his prior disciplinary record and relative short
service of about three and one-half years, jusitifies his discharge
The Union denies that the grievant was asleep. Alternatively,
the Union argues that even if he dozed off while at his work place
in the tool crib, it was inadvertent, not intentional, that no
production was lost and no employees were delayed or inconveniencec
since none sought tools during that period of time.

Also, the

Union contends that because the discharge notice gave "sleeping on
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the job" as the only reason for the grievant's termination, the
Company may not now refer to or make use of his prior disciplinary
record involving other offenses, to support its action.
The record establishes to my satisfaction that the grievant
was asleep at his work place during his regular shift hours.
think he dozed off, not intentionally, but negligently.
I do not find him culpable of willful misconduct.

I

Hence,

However I find

that he had been previously cautioned not to fall asleep while on
the job - when apparently he appeared to be dozing or on the verge
of dozing-and at that time warned by supervision that it could
result in his dismissal.
These facts, standing alone, would not in my judgement
constitute cause for discharge.

However I reject the Union's

argument that the Company is confined to the charge of "sleeping
on the job" in justifying the imposition of the penalty of
discharge.
The Union is correct when it points out that an employer who
discharges an employee for one offense, may not sustain its action
on other grounds.

But that is not the case here.

The grievant

was asleep on the job, and that offense was the grounds upon which
his discharge was "triggered."

The Company's resort to his prior

disciplinary record was not a change in its charge against the
grievant, but rather was utilized to determine the severity of the
penalty to be imposed.
I do not view the discharge notice as a "common-law" pleading.

The Company's reference to "sleeping on the job" as the

-3reason for the discharge, meant, I conclude, that that offense
"triggered" disciplinary action, but the penalty of discharge was
based not on that offense alone, but on the grievant's entire
record, culminating in that particular offense.
It is well settled that an employer may make use of an
employee's past offenses and disciplinary penalties in deciding
the penalty to be imposed for the last or latest in a series of
work rule infractions.

I conclude that that is what the Company

did here, properly within the meaning and intent of that accepted
procedure.
The grievant's prior disciplinary record includes verbal
cautions or written warnings for absenteeism and unsatisfactory
work, poor attendance, leaving the plant without permission,
tardiness; a three day suspension for poor attendance and failure
to report for work, and another three day suspension for poor
attendance, all between June and November 1977.
The foregoing disciplinary penalties are consistant with
the rule of progressive discipline for offenses which standing
alone do not justify summary dismissal, but which cumulatively,
through progressively more severe penalties, may add up to cause
for and result in discharge.

Also, the process of progressive

discipline need not be confined to subsequent acts of the same
offense, but may be applied, as here, to different work rule
violations.
With regard to the grievant's last offense, it is also well
settled that an employer may properly require his employees to

-4attend to their duties and remain awake and alert during working
hours whether or not actual business or operational transactions
are going on at that time.

Hence, though I recognize that work

in the tool crib may at times be slow, and that involuntary dozing may attend that inactivity, an arbitrator may not override
an employer's right to require that his employees remain awake,
especially where, as here, the particular employee involved had
been warned about his apparent tendency to doze off.

Consequentl)

that no production was lost or that no employees were unattended
during the time that the grievant was asleep are matters solely
for the Company's consideration, and not conditions which negate
or limit the Company's right to take disciplinary action.
Viewing the grievant's act of sleeping on the job

in the

light of prior warnings to him not to fall asleep and against the
backdrop of his prior disciplinary record which properly followed
the required process of progressive discipline, I cannot find
contractual fault with the Company's decision to impose the
penalty of dismissal.

That the arbitrator may personally believe

that a lesser penalty (such as a lengthy suspension) would have
been adequate, does not mean that the Company contractually erred
in imposing the greater penalty of discharge.

And where, as here,

the Company has the contractual right of discharge, as the final
penalty in the progressive discipline sequence, the arbitrator is
barred from substituting his judgement on what an adequate penalty
would be for the Company's right to impose a different penalty.
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Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly sworn, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties makes
the following AWARD:
The discharge of Domenic Palazzo did
not violate the contract and was for
just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: October 25, 1978
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty-fifth day of October, 1978, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 144, Hotel, Hospital,Mursing
Home and Allied Health Services
Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO
and
Metropolitan New York Nursing
Home Association, Inc., on behalf
of its Members

OPINION

and
AWARD

This proceeding is pursuant to the Ninth and Tenth paragraphs
of my Recommendations of June 16, 1977, which the parties accepted
and adopted as part of their contract.

These paragraphs read:

The contribution to the Welfare Fund shall be
8%7o for the months of December 1976, and January,
February and March of 1977. However, for January,
February and March of 1977, the 3%% of the 8%% shall
be placed in the payout balloon. From April 1 to
October 1, 1977 the contribution rate to the Welfare
Funds shall be 570. From October 1^, through the balance of the contract the monthly contribution to the
Welfare fund shall be determined on a month by month
basis by the arbitrator, and it shall be no less than
5% and no greater than 97a. (underscoring supplied)
The criteria which is of principle interest to
the arbitrator in determining the monthly contribution
percentages, consist of 2 items: 1) that the fund
maintain a reserve of $3 million, and 2) the fund be
capable of and pay the present level of benefits at the
present cost of those benefits.
More specifically, the instant case involves determinations by
this arbitrator of the contribution rates to be paid by the coverec
employers to the Welfare Fund, pursuant to the above underscored
part of paragraph Ninth.
Hearings were held on December 21 and 30, 1977, January 12, 18,
26, February 17, March 23 and 27, 1978, at which time representatives of the above named parties appeared and were afforded full

-2opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived, and a

stenographic record was taken.

In addition to the aforementioned

authority, my Recommendations of June 16, 1977 set forth the
fundamental conditions for consideration of retention of the lower
contribution rate to the Welfare Fund for the period within the
arbitrator's jurisdiction.

Those fundamental conditions, as set

forth in paragraph Tenth, are: (1) "That the fund maintain a reserve of $3 million, and (2) " the fund be capable of and pay the
present level of benefits at the present cost of those benefits."
As accepted and adopted by the parties as contractual obligations, those two fundamental conditions represent the mutual
agreement of the parties on the threshold characteristics of an
economically sound and fiscally viable Welfare Fund.

Simply put,

if those conditions were met and maintained, a 5% contribution
rate would be adequate; if not, a higher contribution rate would
be mandated.
It should be noted that those two basic requirements are unconditional.

Existing levels of benefits must be met, and a

significant reserve must be maintained.
Therefore, just as it is not relevant to this arbitration how
the administrators of the Fund and the trustees established and
maintained the reserve, any circumstance, even if beyond the control of the parties which caused a depletion of the reserve is
equally irrelevant, and would in that latter event, constitute a
default in and breach of one of the fundamental conditions for the

-3retention of a lower contribution rate.
It is undisputed that levels of existing benefits were met
and paid during the applicable period.
throughout.

So that condition was met

Therefore we need deal only with the "reserve."

The full calendar period of the arbitrator's authority to
determine the contribution rate of the employers to the Welfare
Fund has been completed.

By that fact, together with the compre-

hensive case presentation by the parties, I am fully knowledgeable
about the status of the reserve for the full period of my authority
Therefore I am able to exercise that authority for all the months
involved, namely October 1977 through March 1978.

I am satisfied

under that circumstance, that there is nothing that can be added
by the parties to the record before me, that would be further
material or determinative to my ruling.
I find and conclude that the $3 million reserve was required
industry-wide.

The Association represents a majority of, but not

all the employers.

Pursuant to my Recommendations as accepted

and adopted by the parties, and as a result of vigorous and determined efforts by the Association among its members, .payments due
the Fund were made, and a reserve of somewhat over $2 million was
established.

Inasmuch as a substantial part of that reserve was

made up of payments by Association members, I find and determine
that that quantity of payment by Association members represented
reasonable and substantial compliance by the Association, on a
proportionate basis, with the industry-wide $3 million commitment.

-4That reserve was maintained for the months October 1977
through February 1978.

In March 1978, or as applicable to that

month, the reserve of more than $2 million was transfered from the
Welfare Fund to the Pension Fund, by action of the trustees,
following receipt of an opinion and recommendations of the New
York City regional office of the United States Department of Labor
That transfer, though arguably beyond the control or fault of the
Association, nonetheless defeated one of the two unconditional
requirements for the retention of the lower contribution rate for
the month of March 1978.
Arbitrators are bound to the terms of the contract.
less of the reason,

Regard-

the fact remains that for the month of

March 1978, the Welfare Fund did not have the contractually required reserve.

Therefore I have no choice but to apply the

result mandated by the contract in that event - to increase the
contribution rate to the Welfare Fund for the single month that
the reserve was not maintained.
Accordingly, for the months October 1977 through February
1978, when both fundamental conditions were met or substantially
met, the employers' monthly contribution rate to the Welfare Fund
shall be 5%.

For the month of March 1978 the contribution rate

is raised to and shall be 8%70.

As to the March 1978 rate and

because of the difficult financial condition of many of the
employers, the employers shall forthwith pay no less than 5^%
thereof, with the 370 balance to be paid in monthly

installments
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of no less than %% over no more than the six month period commencing July 1, 1978.
The parties are cautioned not to construe this decision as
determinative or even indicative, one way or the other, of what
the monthly contribution rate to the Welfare Fund shall be under
the current collective bargaining agreement effective April 1,
1978.

That question remains for negotiation between the parties

and failing their agreement, for arbitration.
The record discloses that some employers are or were delinquent
and/or late in their payments to the Welfare Fund and/or in meeting their "pay-out" or "pay-up" agreements to said Fund.

Under

the contract I am "authorized" to penalize those employers, but
not required to do so at this time.

I shall not impose penalties

with this decision but instead shall issue a directive and a
warning.

The directive is that all employers in any way delinquent

shall forthwith become current in and/or in compliance with all
their payment obligations to the Welfare Fund, and that all the
employers shall remain current and in compliance with their payment obligations to the Welfare Fund.

The warning is that hence-

forth employers who remain or become delinquent can expect the
imposition of the penalties set forth in the Third paragraph of my
Recommendations of April 14, 1977, and the Thirteenth paragraph
of my Recommendations of June 16, 1977.
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I retain jurisdiction for the implementation and application
of the foregoing.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: June 30, 1978
STATE OF New York )ss..
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 30th day of June, 1978, before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union
AWARD
and
Misty Harbor, Ltd., a Division
of Jonathan Logan, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
I find that the grievant, Rudolph
Pritchett acted menacingly toward,
and directly threatened physical
harm to employee Myrtle McLean. His
later admission that he "would have
struck her with the soda bottle" had
she repeated certain insulting remarks
to him, is determinative evidence against
him. No matter what words passed between
Miss McLean and the grievant, his actions
cannot be justified. The grievant's
disciplinary record, containing prior
incidents of insubordinate, and threatening outbursts, indicates a propensity
for violence which the Company need not
further tolerate or risk.
Accordingly there was good and sufficient
cause for the discharge of Rudolph Pritchett.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 3, 1978
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )
On this third day of August, 1978, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

